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Abstract  
Reparations are often held up in transitional justice as a ‘victim-centred’ means of dealing with 
the past. Yet transitional justice has often been criticised for side-lining victims in peace 
negotiations or for other actors appropriating their voices for their own political ends. As a 
result, reparations in transitional societies can often be ‘transactional’, an exchange for 
concessions made to perpetrators, such as amnesties, or as ‘blood money’ for victims to forego 
pursuing accountability. This article explores how the political construction of reparations in 
transitional justice can come into conflict with more international law understandings of 
reparations as justice. As such this article argues that reparations in transitional justice have to 
be better conceptualised as in balancing competing political and legal claims, as well as engage 
with emerging debates on transformative justice. 
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Reparations in Transitional Justice: Justice or Political Compromise? 
Reparations as redress to victims of serious violations seem a morally ubiquitous goal in 
transitional societies. Yet reparations are often sites of political, economic and legal contest in 
their value in dealing with the past and preventing future violence. Reparations contain 
important expressive messages about which individuals and harm are deemed worthy to be 
recognised and remedied.1 In addition, difficulties remain in implementing international legal 
norms into contested transitional societies. While there may be peace in a post conflict or 
authoritarian society, reparations can unsettle it by unearthing controversies over who is 
responsible for the violence and who was victimised. These polemics can threaten wider goals 
of the transition of reconciliation and prevention of future violence.   
This article outlines some of these criticisms and how they can be worked through. 
However, despite the normative expansion of reparations for gross violations of human rights 
and serious breaches of international humanitarian law, the engagement of domestic legal 
regimes to incorporate these norms in light of contentious social and political issues remains 
context dependent. Indeed, the success of political claims for reparations being legislated are 
dependent upon timing and the political will to address such issues. This is not to say that 
international norms have no effect, but international or regional court judgments on reparations 
often come into conflict with domestic visions of how the transition and reparations in particular 
should look like.  
This article unpacks these issues by first examining the role of reparations in 
transitional societies in light of international norms, before exploring the political project 
justification for such measures. Together these two areas will hopefully shed some light on the 
continuing development and sites of contest that reparations face in transitional societies that 
can speak to wider challenges and evolution of the field. The piece contrasts this with the 
emerging trend for transformative reparations, and its implications for victim-centred redress. 
While this article does not go as far as to suggest that reparation under the guise of justice are 
a means of political or social reform, it does posit that reparations can be a powerful claims-
making tool by different real or imagined victims that needs to be carefully crafted beyond their 
individual needs to be socially acceptable. This article argues that while there can be a 
dichotomy between international norms and domestic transitional societies’ implementation, 
international and regional bodies should be reflexive to the domestic context while ensuring 
basic tenets of redress for those who suffer serious harm. Moreover, the resort to transformative 
reparations should be detached and discussed as guarantees of non-recurrence to distinguish 
between reparations for past victimisation and the need to prevent future violence. 
The contested role of reparations in transitional societies 
Reparations in transitional justice have arisen from both top-down and bottom-up 
developments. International legal norms have long established that reparations are a way of 
settling breaches of international law.2 In post-conflict settlements, reparations are a means for 
the victor to claim the spoils of war, such as the Treaty of Versailles.3 With the rise of human 
rights law there has been a greater focus on the individual’s right to a remedy for violations.4 
In tandem victims in transitional societies have litigated and politically campaigned for 
reparations at national and regional courts, such as the long claim by survivors of Britain’s 
brutal counter-insurgency against the Mau-Mau in 1950s Kenya. 5  Although international 
norms have raised prospects of what reparations should look like, their implementation within 
states remains patchy and can conflict with prevailing narratives or overarching goals of the 
                                                     
1 M. Urban Walker, Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current Trend in Thinking about 
Gender-Just Reparations, International Journal of Transitional Justice, (2016) 10(1) 108–125, p118. 
2 Germany v Poland, The Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (The Merits), Permanent Court of 
International Justice, File E. c. XIII. Docket XIV:I Judgment No. 13, 13 September 1928, para.125. 
3 Article 231, 1919 Treaty of Versailles. 
4  See A. Cançado-Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2011). 
5 Mutua and Ors v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB). 
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transition. This is particularly apparent with the field of transitional justice, where there 
continues to be differing basis for the justification of reparations in dealing with the past as 
justice, part of the ‘political project’ or through their transformative potential in transitional 
societies. The rest of this section evaluates these perspectives in turn which tackle the 
difficulties of conceptualising the theory and practice of reparations in transitional justice, 
which oscillate between the top-down international perspective and more domestic pragmatic 
approaches. 
Reparations as justice 
Reparations in international law are intended to ‘promote justice’ by vindicating violations 
through obligating the responsible party to redress the harm they caused.6 This position draws 
from private law in domestic legal systems of restitutio in integrum to ensure an individual’s 
right to a remedy for the harm caused.7 Yet the scale of mass atrocities,8 such as the Rwandan 
genocide, can ‘explode the limits of the law’9 making it financially impossible for states to fully 
remedy all victims’ harm and realise their rights.10 Despite this, international judicial bodies, 
treaties and state practice continue to expand the normative role of reparations in redressing 
mass atrocities as a form of justice.11  
Reparations as justice has been criticised as exoticising ordinary corrective justice 
principles. Posner and Vermeule argue that the distinction between ordinary justice in settled 
democracies and transitional justice in societies emerging from conflict or authoritarianism is 
overstated and part of a continuum.12 They suggest that reparations can disrupt this continuum 
by  
compensating victims of the old regime and serve political reform by taking resources 
away from people who threaten the new regime, but they might also unsettle property 
rights and interfere with economic reform by creating new claims against existing 
property holders.13 
 
Reparations in transitional justice are somewhat more complex than this portrayal and have not 
remained static from its initial extension from private law principles, but has through the 
engagement of human rights bodies, in particular the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
broadened the scope of appropriate remedies beyond restitution and compensation.  
Reparations for gross violations of international human rights law and serious breaches 
of international humanitarian law include five main types: restitution; compensation; 
rehabilitation; measures of satisfaction; and guarantees of non-repetition. Restitution and 
compensation represent traditional private law property and monetary forms of redress, but 
have been expanded to include restoration of rights and non-pecuniary awards for moral 
damage. Rehabilitation is focused on the restoration, as far as possible, of the individual’s 
physical, mental and social integrity, through measures such as reconstructive surgery and 
                                                     
6 Principle 15, UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147 (2005). 
7 D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, (OUP 2005, 2nd edn). 
8 Mass atrocities refers to gross violations of human rights and international crimes, including war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
9  L. Kohler and H. Saner (eds.), Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: Correspondence: 1926–1969, 
(Harcourt Brace International 1992), p.54. 
10 A. Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs Reflections from International Experience, in P. de 
Greiff (ed.), Handbook of Reparations, (OUP 2006), 650-675. 
11 R. Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A New Frontier, in de Greiff, ibid. 478-
503. For instance Article 75, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and Articles 31, 34-39, 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. See also Rule 150, ICRC 
Customary Law Database.  
12 E. Posner and A. Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, Harvard Law Review 117(3) 
(2004), 761-825. 
13 Ibid, p766. 
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psychological counselling. Measures of satisfaction represent measures intended to officially 
acknowledge the wrongfulness of the victim’s suffering and responsibility of those who caused 
it through investigations, apologies and memorials. Guarantees of non-repetition are measures 
to reform state institutions and to tackle the underlying causes of victimisation, such as civilian 
control of the military. 
Proponents of reparations as justice suggest that combining material and symbolic 
reparative measures can overcome the insufficiency of money in remedying mass atrocities.14 
Beyond the substantive outcomes of the forms of reparations, there are also procedural justice 
considerations to ensure victims have their interests considered in reparation programmes and 
that the process itself does not cause further trauma. Danieli suggests that victims’ procedural 
role in each step of the justice process as, ‘an opportunity for redress and healing’.15 Respecting 
victims’ interests by allowing them rights to participate, be informed and help to shape 
reparation outcomes can improve their satisfaction.16 However as Hamber submits reparations 
can be a ‘double edged sword’ as the promise of full remedy in international standards can 
never be achieved, no matter how inclusive or sensitive the justice or administrative reparation 
process.17 That said the discourse of rights as legal entitlements has important implications in 
recognising victims’ agency to claim redress for violations, thereby offering them a legal 
avenue at regional or international courts or bodies where there is a lack of domestic remedy. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been integral in recognising individuals’ right 
to reparations in the face of domestic intransigence to acknowledge and remedy their harm.  
In light of this legally dominated construction of remedy and reparations, implementing 
international legal norms on reparations remains hotly contested in many transitional societies. 
With scarce resources and reparations acknowledging individuals as ‘deserving’ of redress, it 
can give rise to competition between victims and public attacks on individuals’ eligibility.18 
Such competition even when through legal processes may not all be fair and equal. Urban elites 
or ‘celebrity’ victims who have access to the media or fit their narrative of ‘innocent’ or 
‘vulnerable’ victims and likely to be more effective in leveraging political change, to have the 
financial resources to hire lawyers to represent their interests or can at least navigate legalese.  
Victims excluded from reparation programmes emboldened with their right to remedy 
can also challenge it through domestic and international courts.19 This litigation can force 
politically agreed and legislated programmes to be subject to judicial or international scrutiny, 
which can upset wider social acceptance and funding of such programmes. This can be seen 
with the inclusion of victimised members of terrorist organisations, such as the Shinning Path 
in Peru, through claims at regional human rights courts for reparations where they were 
excluded under domestic reparation programmes.20 This reflects the limitations of international 
law, which is state-centric in its obligations for reparations. Moreover, it demonstrates the wider 
                                                     
14 P. de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in Greiff n.10, 451-477; and E. Verdeja, A Normative Theory of 
Reparations in Transitional Democracies, Metaphilosophy 37(3–4) (2006), 449-469. 
15 Y. Danieli, Massive Trauma and the Healing Role of Reparative Justice, in C. Ferstman, M. Goetz, 
and A. Stephens (eds), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making (Martinus Nijhoff 2009), 41–78, p47. 
16 J. Wemmers, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Kugler 1996), p146–147. 
17 B. Hamber, Repairing the Irreparable: Dealing with the double-binds of making reparations for crimes 
of the past, Ethnicity and Health 5(3/4) (2000) 215-226, p219. 
18 L. Huyse, Victims, in D. Bloomfiled, T. Barnes and L. Huyse (eds.), Reconciliation after violent 
conflict: A handbook, IDEA (2002), 54-65, p64. 
19 Gusavo Gallón y otros, Corte Constitucional C-370/2006, 18 May 2006; and Case of the Afro-
descendant communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 20 November 2013. Series C No. 
270. 
20 See Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 25 November 
2006, Series C No.160 (IACtHR). L. Moffett, Reparations for ‘guilty victims’: Navigating Complex 
Identities of Victim-Perpetrators in Reparation Mechanisms, International Journal of Transitional 
Justice (2016) 10(1) 146-167. 
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challenges of the law in effectively grappling with the reality of violence in transitional justice 
involving a myriad of responsible actors beyond the state. 
Although these controversies are most acutely felt in reparations, they are symptomatic 
of wider debates on competing narratives of the conflict/past, the transition itself, or how a 
society is moving toward. Falk highlights that reparations in addressing mass atrocities, norms 
in international law are authoritative, but their implementation needs to be context-dependent 
and responsive to local needs.21 The difficulty with such an approach is that rights for victims 
can upset this balance of developing bespoke local approaches in transitional societies. As such 
the international norm justice aspect of reparations as a right and the political project vision of 
such redress remain within two different silos. In practice states and international bodies need 
to recognise the conflict between the two and how to  better complement rather than compete 
with each other in the future. 
Despite the normative growth of international standards on reparations, only 14 out of 
84 countries between 1970 and 2004 implemented reparations.22 This picture has not improved 
over the past decade with reparations called for in Kenya, Nepal, Uganda, Northern Ireland, 
Cambodia and El Salvador being unheeded, neglected or shelved. It is common for subsequent 
governments to ignore or delay reparations in the face of more perceived pressing concerns in 
transitional societies.23 Even victims in the short-term may prioritise assistance and security 
over more common transitional justice goals of truth, justice and reparations.24 Accordingly, 
reparations as a construct of justice is supposed to be responsive to the disparate harms victims 
suffer during political violence. However, in transitional societies reparations are also tempered 
by moral and political claims-making around transitional goals and implementation where 
victimhood and responsibility are not so clear-cut and settled. 
Reparations as a political project 
Much of the contemporary literature on reparations in transitional societies concentrates on the 
construction of the legal framework of domestic reparation programmes as a ‘political 
project’. 25 In such contexts reparations serve not only to remedy past violations, but also 
acknowledge victimisation and the wrongful acts of responsible parties. This public recognition 
can also be future looking by reconstituting victims and communities’ identities and reaffirming 
their dignity and social inclusion. As Pablo de Greiff, the UN Special Rapporteur on Truth, 
Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence, argues that despite the limits of full remedy for 
victims of mass atrocities, justice as recognition, by building civic trust and social solidarity, 
should guide large administrative programmes rather than case-by-case awards.26 As such, 
reparations as a political project reflects a more expressive function in delivering remedial 
measures to large numbers of victims, both in terms of the political symbolism of such measures 
and the social inclusion they connote.  
Reparations as a political project can also address historical injustice. Victims of 
historical atrocities face a number of legal procedural barriers such as statutes of limitations, 
causation and sufficient evidence for civilian courts, which prevent them from seeking 
reparations. More effective avenues to redress can be through leveraging political support. This 
is apparent with the case of the interned Japanese-Americans interned by the US during the 
Second World War. Some of those interned were unsuccessful in bringing legal proceedings 
against the government in the years after the war. In was only in the late 1990s after years of 
political lobbying did the US government agreed to pay $20,000 to each surviving internee.27 
                                                     
21 Falk n.11, p491. 
22  Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne and Andrew Reiter, Transitional Justice in the Balance: Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Efficacy, USIP (2010), p53. 
23 Lars Waldorf, Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs, Social and 
Legal Studies 21(2) 171–186, p177. 
24 Ibid, p178. 
25 P. de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in Greiff n.10, 451-477, p458. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See E. K. Yamamoto and L. Ebesugawa, Report on Redress The Japanese American Internment, in de 
Greiff n.10, 257-283. 
 6 
However, the payment itself was a symbolic gesture, a ‘token’ that did not correspond to the 
severity of individuals’ suffering.28 Eligibility was for only those who survived to the passing 
of the law in 1988.29 Peruvian-Japanese who were abducted by American forces to be interned 
in the US during the same period were originally excluded from the scheme, only obtaining 
$5,000 each after successfully challenging the law through the courts. Thus although the legal 
limits of reparations can be overcome by pragmatic political negotiation, reciprocal pressure 
can be made through courts in broadening politically agreed reparations. 
Reparations can be more political attuned in negotiations in satisfying different 
stakeholders. As victim-centred measures of redress, reparations can be a counterbalance to 
other concessions made to ex-combatants. Hazan refers to this political horse-trading as 
‘transactional’, whereby combatants can avail of demobilisation or reduced sentences in 
exchange for victims obtaining reparations, keeping different stakeholders placated and 
maintaining the legitimacy of the transitional process.30  By way of example the Colombian 
Peace and Justice Law 2005 allowed members of paramilitary groups to obtain reduced 
sentences of 5-8 years in exchange for assets obtained through illegal activities being 
surrendered for reparations to victims. These exchanges were part of a broader comprehensive 
approach to address the responsibility of the paramilitary groups by requiring their members to 
demobilise, contribute to finding the truth and collaborate with authorities.31 
The distinction between reparations and accountability is not so transactional or 
dichotomous, but can be complementary. However, often political negotiations is that victims’ 
interests are neglected or side-lined as priorities of more powerful political actors take centre 
stage. Despite the normative development of reparations in international law and state practice 
in transitional societies, the burden in claiming redress remains on victims to mobilise support 
for the creation of reparation programmes or claim remedies before domestic and international 
court. Time and again victims are forgotten in peace negotiations between belligerents or 
transitions in governments after conflict or authoritarianism. Victims do not have sufficient 
bargaining power to shape these new power arrangements to their own needs and are often left 
out of the decision making process for transitional justice mechanisms. Moreover, reparation 
mechanisms created by political elites can often silence and marginalise non-elites and women 
in particular, who are not part of the political negotiation.32  
The Colombian Peace and Justice Law itself was criticised for only benefitting victims 
of paramilitary violence, and neglecting victims of state atrocities.33 This was only addressed 
in 2011 under the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448) that allowed claims against 
state forces, but mainly focused on land restitution. That said the Colombian peace talks with 
FARC in Havana, Cuba have involved numerous victim representatives and will hopefully 
provide more inclusive and sensitive victim proposals on reparations. The Colombia case 
represents an evolving reparations programmes dependent on political negotiations with 
different factions and the inclusion of previous hidden ‘new’ victims. 
Perhaps an aspect less examined is the political agency victims project in transitional 
societies that leverage reparations to be implemented by states. In the aftermath of mass 
atrocities, reparations as redress are not handed to victims from benevolent former belligerents; 
                                                     
28 A. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, NYU Annual Survey of 
American Law, 58(4) (2002), 497-556, p500. 
29 If they died after its enactment but before payment, their surviving spouse, children or parents would 
be eligible for their claim. Civil Liberties Act of 1988 (public law 100-383), 10th August 1988 102 stat 
905, s.7. Yamamoto and Ebesugawa n.23, p272. 
30  P. Hazan, Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: a framework for evaluating 
transitional justice, International Review of the Red Cross, 88(861) 19-47 (2006), p44. 
31 See para.11.5, Peace and Justice Law 2005; and Gustavo Gallón y otros, Corte Constitucional C-
370/2006, 18 May 2006. 
32 B. Hamber and I. Palmary, Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic Reparations, in R. Rubin-Marín 
(ed.), The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing Human Rights 
Violations, (CUP 2009), 324-381, p331. 
33 C. Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2012), p214-215. 
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they have advocated for in courtrooms, legislatures and on the streets. In a way claims for 
reparations are resistance against continuing of the status quo and oblivion of victims’ 
suffering. It is resistance against the legal regime that tolerated such crimes and failed to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible. It is resistance against society’s indifference and 
disbelief of the victim that state actors, paragons of law and order could be involved in such 
dark atrocities to keep them safe in their beds at night. Or vice-versa that paramilitaries or non-
state armed groups in their glorious resistance against state oppression committed barbaric acts. 
It is resistance against the denial of the victims’ dignity and rights, in that somehow they 
deserved to suffer and be denied a remedy in the past. As such, claiming reparations as a redress 
is a social justice movement often blighted by victims being political denigrated, with 
individuals claiming reparations often being labelled ‘bad victims’ for trying to upset political 
and economic stability of the new regime.34 Even more disconcertingly, victims can often be 
characterised as being opportunistic, after ‘blood money’ or ‘beggars’.35 Despite the normative 
framework in international law that support victims’ right to reparations, political claims-
making is vital in the implementation of reparation programmes. 
Indeed, seeking reparations as redress is not just about compensation or rehabilitation, 
but also the political, moral and social restoration and vindication of the victim’s experience 
and their status. This is apparent in Argentina where the families of those disappeared rejected 
compensation from the government and protected on the grounds that it meant acquiescing to 
the state’s narrative of the conflict that those disappeared had somehow deserved their fate as 
part of the government’s counter-insurgency policy. 36  However as Mendez warns, giving 
victims too much leeway to dictate the political process of reparations through protest can 
undermine the rule of law, and instead it is better for them to engage in participation through 
legal avenues.37 
 The mass scale of atrocities committed by the former regime or during a conflict may 
make reparations that can fully remedy the harm or damage caused impossible to deliver in 
practice under ordinary justice mechanisms. Allocating resources to reparations can be 
controversial in transitional societies, raising questions on whether to focus on economic 
development of a recovering society over redress to those victims most seriously harmed.38 
Starzyk et al suggest that reparations are more likely to be publicly accepted or sociably feasible 
where they do not compromise valuable social resources. 39  Restitution of property or 
redistribution of large amounts of money can unsettle propriety rights and economic systems.40 
More critical voices question the effectiveness, benefits and trade-offs of transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as reparations, in achieving their goals of remedy, ‘healing’, accountability 
and reconciliation.41 Dismissive statements about reparations being ‘too costly’ or society 
looking to ‘move forward’, reflect criticisms more generally of engaging with transitional 
justice mechanisms in many societies.  
                                                     
34 T. Madlingozi, Good victim, bad victim: Apartheid's beneficiaries, victims and the struggle for social 
justice, in W. de Roux and K. van Marle (eds.), Law, Memory and the Legacy of Apartheid: Ten years 
after AZAPO v President of South Africa, Pretoria University Law Press (2007), 107-126, p112-113. 
35 C. Moon, ‘Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?’ Compensation,  Social Control and Social 
Suffering, Social and Legal Studies 21(2) (2012) 187-199; and Madlingozi ibid., p112. 
36 Moon ibid., p194. 
37 J. E. Méndez, Victims as Protagonists in Transitional Justice, International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, 2016, 10(1), 1–5, p3. 
38 G. Manrique Rueda, Lands, wars and restoring justice for victims, in J. Wemmers (ed.), Reparation 
for Victims of Crimes Against Humanity: The Healing Role of Reparations, Routledge (2014), 190-199. 
39 K. Starzyk, D. Gaucher, G. Boese and K. Neufeld, Framing reparation claims for crimes against 
humanity: a social psychological perspective, in Wemmers ibid., 113-125; and E. Nussio, A. Rettberg, 
and J. E. Ugarriza, Victims, Nonvictims and Their Opinions on Transitional Justice: Findings from the 
Colombian Case, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 9(2) (2015) 336-354, p343. 
40 Posner and Vermule, n.12, p784. 
41 Ibid.; and C. Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(1) (2009) 5–27. 
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Despite these criticisms, reparations, notwithstanding their financial cost, as a political 
project represent invaluable political and moral significance to individual victims in reaffirming 
their worth in society and condemning the wrong(s) they have suffered. That while they may 
not prevent past sources of victimisation becoming tomorrow’s justification for violence, do 
represent tangible measures to at least alleviate the worst harm caused by the former regime 
and attempt to ensure greater social inclusion. In such formulation financial cost becomes 
secondary, with even low-income economies such as Sierra Leone able to prioritise reparation, 
or even larger economies like Colombia investing $29 billion to fund its reparation programme 
for 7.6 million victims.42 Such large administrative schemes for reparations keep an eye to 
preventing future conflict by aiming to transform the causes of violence. 
Reparations as transformative 
Given the limits around remedying the past, a more forward-looking perspective of 
transformative justice is increasingly being argued to prevent recurrence of mass atrocities. To 
some scholars transformative justice is aligned more closely to distributive justice to ‘recognise 
unjust distributions of resources and seek to redistribute accordingly, ensuring that underlying 
causes of injustice are addressed.’43 Gready and Robins suggest that measures in transitional 
justice, such as reparations, can only address the symptoms, not the causes of conflict and 
atrocities, instead transformative justice aims to 
provide a platform for transformative change. Transformative justice is defined as 
transformative change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of 
process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and 
intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the 
global level.44 
 
Transformative reparations have been increasingly advocated in the aftermath of widespread 
or systematic sexual violence, where the occurrence of the crime reflects more ingrained 
structural discrimination and marginalisation of certain groups that precipitates such violence. 
More broadly transformative reparations have been engaged with to rethink the nature of 
reparations to examine the gendered impact of conflict on women as well as on social and 
economic rights.45 According to Rubin-Marín, reparations can also have a transformational 
potential ‘to subvert, instead of reinforce, pre-existing structural … inequalities and thereby to 
contribute, however minimally, to the consolidation of more inclusive democratic regimes’.46 
However, ruptures in governance and the law may not offer opportune moments to reform 
social and cultural perceptions and practices when more pressing needs of security, peace and 
redress need to be tackled. 
As Walker suggests beyond the challenges of practical realism and political feasibility, 
transformative reparations endanger displacing victim-centred nature of reparations in 
remedying their harm to instrumentalising them for social justice.47 As such transformative 
                                                     
42  From Principles to Practice Challenges of Implementing Reparations for Massive Violations in 
Colombia, ICTJ 2015. 
43 A. Saris and K. Lofts, Reparation Programmes: A Gendered Perspective, in Ferstman et al. n.14, 79-
99, p93. 
44 P. Gready and S. Robins, From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8, (2014), 339–361, p340. 
45  See Saris and Lofts n.43. Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation, March 2007, para.4 ‘reparation must drive post-conflict transformation of socio-cultural 
injustices, and political and structural inequalities that shape the lives of women and girls; that 
reintegration and restitution by themselves are not sufficient goals of reparation, since the origins of 
violations of women’s and girls’ human rights predate the conflict situation.’ UN Guidance Note of the 
Secretary-General Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, para.4. 
46 R. Rubin-Marín, The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies, in Rubin-Marín n.32, 63-120, 
at 66. See Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UN Guidance Note of the Secretary-
General, June 2014. 
47 Walker n.1, p110. 
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reparations can undermine the importance of the remedial and individual acknowledgement of 
victims’ suffering, by placing it secondary to improving a society and preventing future 
victimisation. The transformative potential of reparations rests in their ability to prioritise and 
publicise victimisation and underlying structural inequalities that precipitated or compounded 
violence. Where reparations are solely used to prevent future victimisation they can be 
overburdened with expectations. Moreover, such guarantees of non-repetition could force those 
individuals who were victimised to forego their remedy for wider benefits of society for 
reconciliation and peace. In such circumstances victims of past violence are silenced or 
neglected to extend the gaze of the transition to future peace and reconciliation. As the use of 
reparations grows within transitional justice and debates on transformative potential increase, 
it is perhaps worth considering whether reparations to individuals and groups should be 
separated from more transformative guarantees of non-recurrence. 
Ultimately reparations in transitional societies can speak to each of these perspectives 
as being about justice, politics and transformation. Reparations as justice reflects important 
standards of procedural justice for victims and best practices in remedying mass atrocities, but 
needs to be tempered with political realities. Victims, while key stakeholders, are not sovereign 
and their interests require balancing with other priorities.  To ensure reparations are not 
overburdened with expectations, they need to be complemented with other transitional justice 
measures such as institutional reform as part of a comprehensive approach in dealing with the 
past. Overarching goals of reparations can be about justice, political posturing and preventing 
such crimes in the future, but such a vision needs to be practically complicated and matched 
with sufficient programme capacity to offer meaningful redress to large victimised populations. 
That said, the official narrative of reparations can be challenged by victims and others on the 
grounds of who is eligible and responsible for such measures. 
Conclusion – Finding the middle ground? 
Reparations remain a key component of dealing with the past in transitional societies that place 
redressing victims’ suffering centre stage. There is a growing body of work displaying a richer 
appreciation of the complexity of mass atrocities committed during conflict and authoritarian 
regimes that recognises the myriad of responsible actors, victims and reasoning for engaging 
with reparations, as well as the difficulties in capacity and political will to meaningfully 
implement such measures. International law and justice approaches to reparations provide some 
form of certainty, but with competing political narratives and goals in transitional societies, 
reparations to some extent need to be contextualised. While there may be challenges in 
implementing international norms on reparations, it forces societies to come up with creative 
solutions to begin to meet or at least strive towards these standards, and to try to coalesce 
political will on the issue. Perhaps a more clarified understanding of reparations in transitional 
societies is being unearthed that reparations are a way to acknowledge the wrongs of the past 
as a starting point of a shared or at least broader narrative of the past. Indirectly by recognising 
the suffering of all sides it can perhaps contribute to more transformative goals of reconciliation 
and prevent of the recurrence of such violence. The future of reparations in transitional societies 
lies in its ability to encapsulate the basic tenets of redress for victims, while helping a society 
to learn from its past to prevent its repetition. 
 
